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The existence of collateral requirements to guarantee repayment on issued securities reduces
in general the eﬃciency of competitive equilibria. The general equilibrium analysis is pre-
sented in a world where reputation plays no role, and the lender always expects a future
payment equal to the future market value of provided collateral. In this context I show that
collateral requirements result in two distinct problems for eﬃciency.
Ia r g u et h a tt w oﬁnancial arrangements, tranching and ﬁnancial pyramiding, arise in
developed capital markets in response to the challenges posed by collateral requirements.
If these arrangements are suﬃciently developed, then the pareto eﬃciency of competitive
equilibria is restored, even in the presence of collateral requirements.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D5, E44
Keywords: Collateral, Pareto Optimality, Financial Arrangements, Tranching, Financial
Pyramiding1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Do ﬁnancial arrangements displayed by developed ﬁnancial systems play an important role
in achieving eﬃcient allocations? This paper argues that, whenever credit is channeled
through the exchange of securities, tranching and ﬁnancial pyramiding are essential to
move an economy toward Pareto eﬃciency.
A security is a promise to be paid, at some point in the future, a certain set of goods.
The trade of a security entails two sides: a seller that borrows money today in exchange of
a (possibly state contingent) payment in the future (the short side) and a buyer that does
the opposite (the long side). Trading a security does two things: reshuﬄe one’s endowment
across contingencies and between the present and the future. The bundle of these activities
is collected under the notion of credit markets.
In reality, most of borrowings - to ﬁnance present investment or consumption - is coupled
with the provision of collateral. The collateral is nothing else that an easy method that the
lender requires to commit the borrower to repay. Colleralized lending is important: central
banks typically keep track and report its amount. The collateral may be held by either
party involved in the transaction or by a third party entrusted by both sides. In developed
ﬁnancial systems, collateral is usually borrower held.
The introduction of collateral requirements in the credit market is a relatively recent fea-
ture of ﬁnancial contracts. Contrary to what one may think, since collateral is a guarantee,
credit in economies more uncertain than ours were not subject to collateral requirements.
Cipolla (1976) reports how, at the very outset of ﬁnancial development - in Italy during
the centuries XII through XIV and in Northern Europe afterwards, lending was mostly
related to trade and enforcement was reputation based. This situation did not substantially
change since then and at least until the XIX century, most lending did not require any col-
lateral. In facts, the ﬁrst “modern” banks were almost exclusively involved in subscribing
government bonds, bonds of quasi-public agencies (e.g. South Sea Company, East India
Company) and funding the construction of major public infrastructure (mostly railways) .
To summarize we can say that, before the industrial revolution, lending was trade oriented
or, at most, directed to consumption smoothing, (production was in fact labor intensive).
Reputation played a central role and even after the industrial revolution most lending was
directed toward governments and quasi public institutions: their credibility was enough
to waive collateral requirements. Collateralized credit arised at a later stage of ﬁnancial
development.
Collateralized credit started when the economic development and technological shifts
increased the demand for investment. As more and more capitals needed to be built up, the
ﬁnancial structure began to stretch. Financial innovation became so the necessary condition
for economic development. Collateralized credit was one of these innovations. An innovation
responding to a new particular characteristic of economic development: the diﬀusion of
private entrepreneurship made investment opportunities widespread. Reputation based
lending within small groups was no longer enough to enforce the exchange of funds between
parties that had no previous relationship. Collateral arose then as a practical enforcement
mechanism able to move capital in largely decentralized market where anonymity is the rule
1more than the exception.
In order to study the role of collateral, I will work in a world in which reality is exac-
erbated because reputation plays no role. Naturally this is an unrealistic restriction that
I adopt for clarity purpose. If someone gets a loan from someone else, the lender always
expects a future payment equal to the future market value of the collateral. Therefore
the lender always wants to secure his repayment through the provision of collateral by the
borrower. The collateral typically (but not necessarily) is a physical durable good, like a
house or a car. In more general term, anything entitling the owner to some share of positive
wealth in the future is - potentially - collateral.
Firstly, I analyze what problems, in terms of equilibrium eﬃciency, arise because of
collateral requirements on borrowing. Then I will focus on the role of ﬁnancial arrangements
- particularly tranching and pyramiding - have in easing the collateralization constraint and
optimizing the use of available collateral. This will help to study the problems arising with
collateralized lending, complementing some previous works1 and highlighting the necessary
conditions to restore the pareto optimality of market allocations.
1.1 Endogenous Asset Structure
The introduction of collateral, and the related possibility of default, can result in the creation
of many diﬀerent securities, starting from an elementary asset structure. The ﬁrst objective
in the present work is to analyze how active ﬁnancial contracts - deﬁned by the couple actual
payoﬀs and collateral level - are endogenously selected in equilibrium. In general - I argue
- the speciﬁc ﬁnancial contracts that will be traded depend on the interaction between two
factors: the underlying characteristics of the goods/assets that can be used as collateral
and the distribution of individual endowments. The properties of the available collateral
are crucial to the determination of the particular credit contract that will be exchanged and
thus to determine when and why markets may fail to complete.
To focus the matter one may think about a ﬁrm borrowing on the market. The ﬁrm
must then provide some collateral. Since the amount of collateral determines the actual
payoﬀs of this security, the speciﬁc value of collateral across contingencies aﬀects the kind
of security that can be created. For instance, consider an economy where the underlying
formal promise is a bond paying the same in every contingency: if the agent is forced to
pool all his collateral together, he may be unable to default and thus oﬀer securities with
state contingent payments. This may constitute a problem in many instances where the
ﬁrm is looking for risk sharing contracts. It is immediate to observe that two factors shape
the ability of an economic agent to create a security and sell it: ﬁrstly, what part of his
future wealth one can use as collateral and, secondly, how linked together his wealth is.
Given the outlined factors, I show that tranching and pyramiding address these problems.
1.2 Financial Arrangements
Once the ﬁnancial contracts arising in equilibrium are identiﬁed, it is natural to turn to the
question of pareto optimality of the equilibrium in collateralized economies. I show that the
1Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), Geanakoplos (2002).
2market equilibrium is pareto eﬃcient if two conditions hold: ﬁrstly, a suﬃciently large share
of one’s future endowment may be pledged as collateral; secondly, individual endowment
can be "oﬀered" in suﬃciently small subsets to back one’s short positions. In particular - it
may be shown -, if aggregate endowment in the economy is derived only through production
and is suﬃciently "separable"2, the equilibrium asset structure is always complete and the
equilibrium allocation is pareto optimal. I argued that two important ﬁnancial arrangements
- tranching and ﬁnancial pyramiding - are important to restore the pareto optimality of
these equilibria. They arise in the attempt to push the economy toward Pareto optimal
allocations.
These ﬁnancial arrangements are common in ﬁnancial markets (e.g. credit insurance
provided by investment banks, the market for mortgage pools and derivatives) and are
widely used by ﬁnancial intermediaries in their attempt to sell risk insurance to economic
agents. I now turn to describe them in greater details and highlight the speciﬁcp r o b l e m s
they address, before introducing the model of collateralized economies (KE from now on).
1.2.1 Tranching
By tranching I denote the possibility that the same amount of wealth (physical ofr ﬁnancial)
is used as collateral to back more than one short position (promise to pay in the future).
In reality this is admitted at a variety of levels that ranges from the derivatives market
to the possibility of starting more than one mortgage on the same house. Tranching is an
important arrangement. In particular, one may recall from the discussion above that the
”separability” of future endowment aﬀects dramatically individual’s ability to sell ﬁnancial
contracts and, thus, borrow.
In principle, if the entire future endowment of one individual were linked together, she
may be forced to choose between one ﬁnancial contract and the other but being unable
to achieve any combination of them. Recall the example of our ﬁrm: it is possible to
identify the value of a company but not of one of its asset separatedly. Then one can
write a ﬁnancial contract using the whole company as collateral but not parts of it. This
forces the company to choose among ﬁnancial contracts without being able to combine
them. Tranching, allowing diﬀerent ﬁnancial contracts to be backed by the same collateral,
is the ﬁnancial arrangement that prevents this problem. Observe that in Arrow - Debreu
economies every agent can borrow using any subset of his individual future endowment.
Preventing this possibility pushes the economy away from pareto optimality.
1.2.2 Pyramiding
By ﬁnancial pyramiding, or simply pyramiding, I deﬁne the chain of promises that arises
when securities/ﬁnancial contracts can be used as collateral. Think about the following case:
all borrowing is collateralized in the economy but agent 1 holds a (physically collateralized)
promise to be paid by agent 0. Agent 1 could then issue a promise to pay agent 2, backed
by the promise he holds from agent 0. Agent 2 could then do the same: issue a promise
to pay agent 3 in the future, backed now by the promise of 1. It is only the collateral on
2This will be made precise later on.
3the ﬁrst security - the one issued from 0 and sold to 1 - to be required to be some physical
asset, like a house or a factory plant.
One of the major innovations of developed ﬁnancial systems is to allow the use of secu-
rities - i.e. purely ﬁnancial contract - as collateral. The rationale for it should be, by now,
straight forward: this is how ﬁnancial markets loosen the collateralization constraints, allow
agents to use larger shares of their future endowments and maximize potential borrowing.
In conclusion: pyramiding is the ﬁnancial arrangement that allows to borrow against the
ﬁnancial part of individual wealth. In this way it economizes on the use of collateral and,
avoiding the selling of long positions, may substitute missing ﬁnancial markets. I turn now
to the formal analysis.
2 Collateralized Economy (KE)
2.1 Two Periods Setup3
We want to study how the asset structure arises endogenously in KEs and how we evaluate
their equilibrium allocations in terms of pareto eﬃciency. Assume an economy lasting for
two periods. In the second period, S contingencies can realize. We will refer to the ﬁrst
period by s =0and to a contingency in the second period by s ∈ {1,...,S}. The basic
features of the economy are described herebelow.
1. Commodities: L consumption goods in each s ∈ {0,1,...,S} so that the total con-
sumption bundle of agent h is ch ∈ R(S+1)L.I d e ﬁne csl and psl as, respectively,
consumption and spot market price of commodity l in contingency s;
2. Asset Structure: lending is channeled through the exchange of securities which must
be guaranteed by the provision of collateral. Security j is deﬁn e db yav e c t o ro f




















k/1012 : k ∈ NSLª
Moreover, for clarity, it is convenient to use diﬀerent letters to denote short and long
positions since short positions must be backed by collateral. I deﬁne ϕh
j as the number
of units of security j issued by borrower h and θh
j as the number of units of security
j purchased by lender h.
3This setup is related to Geanakoplos [2002], and Genakoplos and Zame [2002].















































U (.) is weakly monotonic, i.e. x> >y⇒ U (x) >U(y)
x,y ∈ <(S+1)L
(1)


































dh + ih = S(eh
1) ≤ eh
1 (3)
where dh represents the share of individual’s future endowment that can be freely
split to back diﬀerent security while ih represents the share of individual’s future
endowment that can be employed as collateral to back securities but can not be used
to back more than one security at the same time. Finally, S(eh) measures the total
share of an individual endowment that can pledged as collateral and so it tracks the
tightness of the collateralization constraint. In addition to future endowment, I allow





psl · j,a sc o l l a t e r a l( ﬁnancial pyramiding). The securities













• Separability Constraint: within S(eh) the share of future endowment that can be
used as collateral, there is some part that can be employed to back promised only in
"ﬁxed" portions
0 <i h ≤ S(eh) (4)
Whenever 0 <i h, I will say that collateralizable endowment is not fully separable.
52.2 Competitive Equilibrium in KE:




































dh =0 , ∀j (7)
The setup is quite general and departs from the standard Arrow-Debreu framework in
only one feature: collateral must be provided anytime an agent goes short in some security.
Each agent decides which contracts he will trade depending on his endowment and the
level of collateral each contract requires. All the contracts will be priced but only some will
be actively traded in equilibrium. This is to say that the asset structure will be endogenous.
This allows us to draw important conclusions as we will discuss in the following section.
Finally, note that each collateral level deﬁnes a diﬀerent ﬁnancial contract and each ﬁnancial
contract deﬁnes a market that must clear in equilibrium.
2.3 Assessing Pareto Eﬃciency of KE Equilibrium
In setups like this one, as in Geanakoplos (2002) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), the
market selects which ﬁnancial contracts will be actively traded in the CE, among all the
possible ones. These contracts are the ones that suit best the characteristics of individual
endowments. In this section I want to push this observation to its non immediate impli-
cations. This will highlight the two factors crucial for the competitive equilibrium in KEs
to replicate the Pareto eﬃcient Arrow-Debreu allocation. This may eventually allow us to
provide an explanation of why certain ﬁnancial arrangements (tranching and pyramiding)
arise.
To this purpose, I exploit the proposed general setting and try to analyze when and why
it may diverge from the Arrow-Debreu allocation implied by complete markets. The ﬁrst
feature one has to look at to address the question of economic eﬃciency uses the following
deﬁnition:
6Deﬁnition 1 Future endowment is fully collateralizable iﬀ S(eh
1)=eh
1, ∀h,a n dﬁnancial
pyramiding is admitted, i.e. each individual can put up his entire future physical endowment















The fact that future endowment is fully collateralizable is of immediate intuitive impor-
tance. If no part of one’s future endowment can be used to collateralize his short positions,
his ability to borrow from the future and trasfer wealth across contingencies is substantially
invalidated. If, on the other hand, agents can employ their entire future wealth, both phys-
ical and ﬁnancial, as collateral they trade the ﬁnancial contracts of their preference, i.e. the
contracts that best ﬁt their needs. Therefore, full collateralization makes the completion of
the asset structure more likely. The potential problem of lacking fully collateralizable future
endowment is illustrated through the following example, which illustrates a case with less
than perfect collateralization of physical endowment:
Example 1 There is an economy with S =2 ,L=1and many agents with diﬀerent
endowments. Agent h is endowed by eh =( 0 ,1,2). One can think about the real life case
of an unemployed looking for a job that can be high or low paying. It would be very hard
for this individual to borrow against his future income, him being unemployed. At the same
time, if he has a strictly concave utility, he w o u l dl i k et os m o o t hh i sc o n s u m p t i o na c r o s s
contingencies and between the present and the future. In order to do so he needs to borrow
today using future endowment as collateral. If, for instance, he can not use his endowment
at s =2as collateral (h may ﬁnd diﬃcult to go to a bank and say that he will have an
investment banker salary next year!), he can not borrow using the contingency in which he
is richer. Therefore, his ability to smooth is substantially reduced.
The second example that follows illustrates the limitations to risk smoothing that indi-
viduals face if they can not use as collateral their long positions, i.e. if ﬁnancial pyramiding
does not take place. This is an important fact since, in both complete and incomplete
markets economies, it is always assumed that each individual can use his assets payoﬀst o
balance his budget constraint. Not allowing to do so can result in important departures
from the standard analysis as the following example shows:
Example 2 Consider an economy with S =2 ,L=1.A g e n t h is endowed with eh =
(2,1,0).A s s u m i n g h has strictly concave utility, he would like to save for the future and
split is consumption equally across contingency at the given market prices. Assume that,
given the fundamentals in the economy, only two ﬁnancial contracts arise in equilibrium









7Clearly the span of these assets is R2 and so markets are complete. In order for h to achieve









.T h i s
portfolio can not be acquired if h is not allowed to guarantee the payment in s =2of asset
1 with asset 2. Pyramiding is therefore crucial to fully collateralize individual endowment
and so achieve his optimal consumption.
Fully collateralizable wealth does not solve all the problems that collateral requirements
impose on the economy. The discussion above highlighted a second factor that must be
considered in addressing the issue of pareto optimality in th economy’s allocation: the
indivisibility of individual future endowment. To this purpose I deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 2 Future endowment is fully separable if any element of the power set of
individual endowment can be put up as collateral, i.e. if constraint (4) becomes:
0=ih <S (eh)
The issue of “indivisibility” in future endowment is quite important in reality. Future
e n d o w m e n tc a nn o ta l w a y sb eu s e da sc o l l a t e ral in the desired subset. If each individual
could use any subset of his future endowment as collateral, it would be very easy for individ-
uals to issue Arrow securities. The lack of separability in future endowments may explain
why, in the real world, these securites are rarely traded.
To build an intuition, one may think about the case when individual future endowment
is a house. A house is a good taking strictly positive, though diﬀerent, values in all contin-
gencies. When this is employed as collateral, the agent determines the ﬁnancial contract he
trades by the share of the house that he uses as collateral. In particular, since the actual
payment is equal to collateral worth in all contingencies, the individual may be selling posi-
tive future payments even when he may not want to. This forced overcollateralization easily
results in the trade of (subjectively) suboptimal contracts and “waste” of collateral. Pareto
suboptimality of the equilibrium is just consequential. The following example illustrates
the argument:
Example 3 Consider an economy with S =2 ,L=1where each agent can put his entire fu-
ture endowment as collateral and the exogenously given asset pays oﬀ in the numeraire good:
A =[ 1 ], ∀s. There are three individuals g, h and i, with identical probability assessment
(i.e. Pr(s =1 )=1 /2), strictly concave utility and endowment, respectively, eg =( 3 ,0,3),
eh =( 3 ,3,0),e i =( 0 ,3,6). The endowment of individual i is partially indivisible. It is
in fact partitioned into the following two subsets: α =( 0 ,1,6) and β =( 0 ,2,0). This re-
sembles the real life situation in which an individual future wealth is twofold (e.g. a house
and a capital gain). i can thus trade only two ﬁnancial contracts, i.e. only two level of
collateral j coupled with A, as he wants to smooth his consumption across time and con-
tingencies. To this purpose he tries to reallocate the income available in s =1 ,2 toward






the α subset of his endowment. Since his future endowment can not be separated, he can
sell only one unit of the asset aj=α. g or h can trade any ﬁnancial contract satisfying their
8budget constraint. The equilibrium of the economy with the abovementioned non separable
endowment is xg =( 9 /4,9/4,39/20),x h =( 1 2 3 /52,123/52,41/20),x i =( 1 8 /13,18/13,5),
q[1,1] =1 4 /13,q [1,0] =1 /2,q [0,1] =1 5 /26; Ug =1 .55,U h =1 .65,U i =1 .30. Notice that
this is diﬀerent from the Arrow Debreu equilibrium x
g
AD =( 9 /4,9/4,27/8),x h
AD =( 2 ,2,3),
xi
AD =( 7 /4,7/4,21/8),q AD
[1,1] =5 /6,q AD
[1,0] =1 /2,q AD
[0,1] =1 /3; Ug =1 .82, Uh =1 .59,
Ui =1 .32. The KE equilibrium is not a pareto optimal allocation. In fact individual i would
be willing to sell asset a[0,1] at a price strictly smaller than q[0,1] =1 5 /26 and individuals
g and h would gladly oblige. But this is exactly what they are not allowed to do. Notice
ﬁnally that the KE equilibrium is not pareto dominated by the allocation in Arrow Debreu.
If economic agents can put any subset of their future endowment as collateral, then,
using perfectly anticipated payments, they can trade as many diﬀerent ﬁnancial contracts
as necessary to complete capital markets.
We can now turn to the question of eﬃciency in KEs. These economies are such that
short sales constraints, i.e. borrowing constraints, exist. Borrowing constraints are enough
to invalidate the pareto optimality of the market allocation. In our setup, since the collateral
r e q u i r e m e n tc a nn o tb ew a i v e d ,h0s ability to borrow is limited by how he can use his future
endowment and portfolio as collateral. This makes limited participation to the asset market
endogenous in our setup. It is probably interesting to observe that, if everyone’s entire
future endowment is fully collateralizable, completely separable and pyramiding is allowed,
the equilibrium allocation is no diﬀerent from the one obtainable in the corresponding Arrow
Debreu economy. This is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 The KE equilibrium allocation is equivalent to the one in the Debreu Economy
deﬁned as follows:





















U (.) is weakly monotonic, i.e. x> >y⇒ U (x) >U(y)
x,y ∈ R(S+1)L










s, h ∈ [0,y] and s ∈ {1,...,S}, is fully collateralizable, fully separable and ﬁnancial
pyramising is admitted..
Proof. In order to prove the equivalence between the two equilibria allocations we only
need to show that the individual maximization problem is equivalent in the two economies














































where the only assets traded are js =
⎡
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;∀s, entitling the buyer to a payment of the nu-




h∈[0,y] is fully collateralizable and separable and ﬁnancial pyramid-
ing is allowed, everyone can trade any of the Arrrow-like assets compatible with his budget
constraint. Finally, since the individual problem in a KE is reduced to the one in an as-
set economy with Arrow securities, the KE is equivalent to the Arrow economy. By the
isomorphism between Arrow and Debreu economies I conclude the proof.
Therefore I have the desired result:
Corollary 1 If future endowment, eh
1, is separable, fully collateralizable and ﬁnancial pyra-
miding is admitted ∀h, then the KE competitive equilibrium is pareto eﬃcient.
2.3.1 Financial Arrangements, Pareto Optimality and Lack of Pareto Ranka-
bility
It is clear by now why the conditions of full collateralization and separability are necessary
to ensure that the pareto optimality of the equilibrium. Why ﬁnancial markets develop
tranching of collateral: it allows to separate individual future endowment. As we have seen,
the separability of endowment is one of the two crucial conditions on which pareto eﬃciency
is based.
It is worthy to recall here the role of ﬁnancial pyramiding to enhance the other condition
necessary for pareto eﬃciency: full collateralization of future endowment. In fact, the
future wealth of one individual consists, in general, of physical endowment (e.g. labor and
capital income) and ﬁnancial assets. Pyramiding, allowing individuals to borrow against
the future value of their ﬁnancial assets, helps the individual to mobilize a higher fraction
of his wealth. This is indeed essential for the attainment of pareto eﬃciency. The formal
argument illustrating this intuition will require the introduction of a multiperiod framework.
This will be the purpose of the following sections and applications.
It is now worthwhile to summarize the two straight forward results of our analysis:
Remark 1 In any KE where the collateralization constraint is binding for at least one
h ∈ [0,y] the equilibrium is pareto suboptimal.
10Obviously one could write an economy with endowments and preferences such that the
collateralization constraint does not bind. Such economy would already be in a Arrow
Debreu equilibrium, before the relaxation of the constraint. Thus the deﬁnition of KE (and
the discussion above) would be irrelevant. But whenever the constraint binds, its pareto
suboptimality would result in equilibrium. The reason is obvious: the binding constraint
does not allow at least one borrower to choose the tangency point of his indiﬀerence curve
and pareto optimality is thus prevented. Example 4 provides an illustration.
The second result is:
Remark 2 The equilibrium of a KE is, in general, not pareto rankable with respect to the
Arrow Debreu allocation.
This simple observation is illustrated through the following example:
Example 4 Assume an Economy with S =1(no uncertainty), one commodity today (x0)







,i∈ {α,β},e α =( 0 ,10,5),
eβ =( 1 0 ,0,5).The collateralization constraint binds such that no agent can put more that
j units of good 1 as collateral. No units of 2 are ever available as collateral. There is one
asset A =[ 1 ]whose price is q.M o r e o v e rw ed e ﬁne p = p2/p1. The pareto optimal Arrow
Debreu allocation is p = q =1 ;xα = xβ =( 5 ,5,5). The KE economy displays a suboptimal
equilibrium for j<5. In particular individual utilities can be represented as follows when







02 4 Collateralization Constraint
Uβ in Thick Line
Finally, the discussion above allows to discuss what happens to the equilibrium allocation
when the collateralization constraint is relaxed. Unfortuntely very little can be established:
some agents may beneﬁt while others lose as well as pareto improved equilibria may be
obtained. Any eﬀect on individual welfare goes through the change in equilibrium prices
that the constraint relaxation determines. Fori l l u s t r a t i v ep u r p o s e sw eu s et h ep r e v i o u s
example. We graph below the change in indirect utility (including the change in equilibrium
prices) when the constraint is relaxed. One may observe that for j slightly bigger than 1 the
economy (locally) generates pareto superior equilibria when the constraint is relaxed.








Collateralization Constraint Collateralization Constraint
Equilibrium Utility Gain (Loss) - Uβ in Thick Line
3C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper focuses on the problems arising from the introduction of collateral requirements
in security markets. Collateral requirements have been a major step in ﬁnancial develop-
ment and provide a rationale for endogenous borrowing constraints. The presented abstract
economy helps to conceptualize the problems related to the existence of collateral require-
ments and how suﬃciently developed tranching and pyramiding - ﬁnancial arrangements
available in actual ﬁnancial markets - may restore Pareto optimality.
The general idea is that ﬁnancial arrangements arise to loosen the constraints on bor-
rowing that collateral imposes. This is in line with the basic intuition of Arrow (1964): as
ﬁnancial markets arise to add or replace missing markets so the speciﬁc ﬁnancial arrange-
ments respond to the constraints imposed on these markets. At an intuitive level, one is
tempted to build an analogy between economies with incomplete markets and KEs. In fact
borrowing limits, implied by collateral requirements, constraint agents’ ability to create
securities and reduce the asset span.
The discussion has so far abstracted from the presence of asymmetric information even
though collateral requirements are usually justiﬁed by some pre-existing informational fric-
tion. In fact, if everyone were able to observe what everyone else is doing, collateral would
not be necessary. It would suﬃce to observe whether each borrower respects his budget
constraints. The provision of collateral ensures the purchaser of a security (the lender) that
payments will be made, reducing the amount of information he needs to collect in order
to forecast the actual payments. This is the reason why collateral requirements have pro-
v i d e dam a j o rs t e pi nﬁnancial development. The only factor the lender must check is the
value of the collateral at the time when payments are scheduled. He does not need to ob-
serve whether the entire portfolio of the borrower is compatible with his budget constraint.
12Therefore collateral acts as a device to economize on the information necessary in markets
characterized by anonimity. As this study argues, the informational eﬃciency of collateral
is not costless though. Collateral requirements constrain individual choices so that market
equilibria may fail to be eﬃcient. The point I have made here is that ﬁnancial arrangements
(tranching and pyramiding) arise to correct these ineﬃciencies.
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